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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Weston Lloyd Ballard appeals from the district court's order revoking his
probation and executing, without reduction, the underlying unified sentence of seven
years, with three years fixed, imposed and suspended upon his plea of guilty to felony
DUI. On appeal, Mr. Ballard asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court has denied him due
process of law and equal protection by refusing to augment the record with transcripts
of his original sentencing hearing, rider review hearing, and first probation violation
disposition hearing. Additionally, Mr. Ballard asserts that the district court abused its
discretion when it revoked his probation and executed his original sentence without sua
sponte reducing it.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
This case began when Mr. Ballard was charged with felony driving while under
the influence of intoxicants 1 (hereinafter, DUI), felony fleeing or attempting to elude a
peace officer, and receiving or transferring stolen vehicles. (R., pp.49-53.) The parties
then entered into a non-binding Idaho Criminal Rule 11 plea agreement under the terms
of which Mr. Ballard agreed, inter alia, to plead guilty to DUI and to the amended charge
of misdemeanor fleeing or attempting to elude an officer, in exchange for which the
State would dismiss the receiving or transferring stolen vehicles charge and recommend
that any sentences on the two charges to which he pleaded guilty would run
concurrently. (R., pp.57-62.)

1 The charge was elevated to a felony based on the allegation that Mr. Ballard had twice
been convicted of DUI in the ten years preceding the current charge. (R., p.54.)

1

Pursuant to the agreement, Mr. Ballard pleaded guilty to DUI and misdemeanor
fleeing or attempting to elude an officer. (R., pp.66-67.) Ultimately, the district court
sentenced Mr. Ballard to a unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, on
the DUI charge, while retaining jurisdiction. 2 (R., pp.85-86.)

Following his rider, the

district court suspended Mr. Ballard's sentence and placed him on a period of probation
of five years.

(R., p.94.) Mr. Ballard later admitted to violating the conditions of his

probation, and his probation was continued with additional conditions added, including a
requirement that he complete an inpatient substance abuse treatment program.
(R., pp.162-66.)
Mr. Ballard was then alleged to have violated his probation as follows: by
consuming alcohol, failing to attend aftercare following his completion of the inpatient
treatment program, failing to complete sixty hours of community service, operating a
motor vehicle without insurance and driving privileges, failing to obey all laws, changing
residence without permission, failing to report to his probation officer as directed, and
failing to make himself "available to supervision and program participation as instructed
by the probation officer" and not actively avoid supervision. (R., pp.190-93, 205-07.)
At the evidentiary hearing, the sole witness called was Mr. Ballard's probation
officer, Jennifer Adler.

Ms. Adler testified that she learned from Mr. Ballard's former

landlord that he had been evicted from his last known address several months earlier,
and that Mr. Ballard did not report this eviction or provide a new address to the
probation department.

3

(Tr., p.2, L.16 - p.3, L.11.) She further testified that, for the

The sentence received on Mr. Ballard's misdemeanor eluding charge amounted to
time-served, and is therefore moot for purposes of this appeal.
3 Defense counsel did not object to Mr. Ballard's probation officer testifying as to
hearsay statements that she purportedly learned from his former landlord. See State v.
Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 768 (2007) (a probationer enjoys a due process right to confront

2
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months of January and February 2011, Mr. Ballard failed to report to the probation
department "about every other week" and did not return her phone messages as he was
supposed to do. (Tr., p.3, L.16 - pA, L.13.)
Ms. Adler then testified that, although Mr. Ballard completed the inpatient
treatment program as ordered, he failed to attend aftercare, which she learned by
talking to his counselor in the program, whom she said was named either Dale or Dan.4
(Tr., p.5, L.17 - p.6, L.17.) With respect to the allegation that Mr. Ballard had failed to
complete sixty hours of community service as a condition of probation, Ms. Adler
testified that she had received no documentation from Mr. Ballard that he had
completed the community service. (Tr., p.6, L.18 - p.7, L.12.)
The State then withdrew the allegation that Mr. Ballard had consumed alcohol,
and sought to replace the allegation that he had failed to obey all laws by driving without
privileges with an allegation that he failed to obey all laws by being convicted of
domestic battery and theft. (Tr., p.7, L.13 - p.8, L.2.) Defense counsel then stipulated
"that he violated the law while on probation based on an incident that happened January
8th."

(Tr., p.10, Ls.22-24.)

The district court then found Mr. Ballard in violation of

probation as to all but the withdrawn allegation. (Tr., p.15, Ls.13-16.)
At the hearing on disposition of Mr. Ballard's probation, defense counsel
requested that the district court send Mr. Ballard on a rider that focused on his
substance abuse problems, rather than the traditional rider in which he had previously
participated.

(Tr., p.18, Ls.5-22.)

The State requested that the district court revoke

witnesses absent the district court making "a specific finding of good cause" to dispense
with confrontation).
4 Again, defense counsel did not object to the use of hearsay statements purportedly
made by a person the probation officer identified as either Dale or Dan in establishing a
violation of this condition. See note 3.
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probation and execute the original sentence. (Tr., p.18, L.25 - p.19, L.7.) Ultimately,
the district court revoked probation, and ordered execution of the underlying sentence
without reduction. (Tr., p.30, Ls.2-6.)
Mr. Ballard filed a Notice of Appeal from the district court's order revoking
probation. 5 (R., p.237.)
On appeal, Mr. Ballard filed a motion to augment and suspend, requesting the
preparation of transcripts of his original sentencing hearing, his rider review hearing,
and the hearing on the disposition of his first probation violation proceeding. (Motion to
Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof.)
The State filed an objection to this motion.

(Objection to "Motion to Augment and to

Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof'.)
Court then issued an order denying Mr. Ballard's motion.

The Supreme

(Order Denying Motion to

Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule.)

Mr. Ballard filed a Rule 35 motion requesting the reduction of the fixed portion of his
sentence to two years, with an increase of the indeterminate portion to five years. That
motion was not supported by new information, and, as such, is not being pursued in this
appeal.
5

4

ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Ballard due process and equal protection
when it denied his motion to augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Ballard's probation
and failed to reduce his sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation?

5

ARGUMENT
I.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Ballard Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcripts

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal.

The only way a court can constitutionally

preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.
In this case, Mr. Ballard filed a Motion to Augment, requesting various transcripts
and argued that, when determining whether to revoke probation, a district court can
consider all of the hearings before and after sentencing.

On appeal, Mr. Ballard is

challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the transcripts.
Mr. Ballard asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the district court's
asserted failure to reduce his sentence upon revoking probation because that decision
was made after the original sentencing hearing, and the district court could have,
therefore, relied on its memory of the hearings in question when it decided to revoke
probation and execute the underlying sentence. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court
erred in denying Mr. Ballard's request.

6

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Ballard Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The
Requested Transcripts

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Ballard With
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit-Based Appellate Review Of His
Claims

The Constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 10. CONST. art.
I § 13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ).
State

V.

Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State

V.

Wood,

132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh

V.

State,

132 Idaho 221,227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is statutory. See I.C. § 19-2801.
Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, the cost of
such transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a).
Idaho court rules also address this issue.

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the

production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.

I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court ..
. ." Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to
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be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases.
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must
provide indigent defendants with appellate records unless some or all of the requested
materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record,

including a stenographic transcript of the

proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts

8

themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p1roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
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In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

In

that case, the state argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257.

The United States

Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts.

The

Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections

to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument that
he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal.

Id. at 195. If the State

wants the defendant's request to be denied, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.

This authority has been

recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals.

See

Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App.
2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 2007).

An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed.

"It is well established that an

appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of
the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial

I
III

I

court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999). If the transcripts are missing,
but the record contains court minutes, that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful
review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, although the Idaho Court of Appeals has
"strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court minutes to
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provide an adequate record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489,
491 (Ct. App. 1999).

In this case, Mr. Ballard presents as an issue on appeal the

question of whether the district court erred by revoking his probation and by failing to
sua sponte reduce his sentence when it revoked his probation. The transcript of the
January 28, 2008, sentencing hearing is necessary because trial counsel addressed the
court in mitigation. Additionally, a transcript of the September 8, 2008, probation
violation admission hearing is relevant because mitigation arguments were made in
favor of Mr. Ballard. (R., p.42.) If Mr. Ballard fails to provide the appellate court with the
requested items, the legal presumption will apply and Mr. Ballard's claims will not be
addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action alone which prevents his access to
the requested items, then such action is a violation of due process, as per Lane, and
any such presumption should no longer apply.
Mr. Ballard spoke to the district court at his sentencing hearing (R., p.83), but
appellate counsel does not know what he said because this Court denied his request
that transcripts of that hearing be prepared. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to
Suspend the Briefing Schedule.)

He also "spoke on his own behalf" at the retained

jurisdiction review hearing on March 2, 2009 (R., p.93); again, appellate counsel does
not know what he said because this Court denied his request that a transcript of that
hearing be prepared. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing
Schedule.) Finally, at his previous probation violation and disposition hearing, at which

I

the district court continued Mr. Ballard's probation, Mr. Ballard admitted to violating the
terms and

conditions of his probation, which

demonstrate an acceptance of

responsibility for his misconduct while on probation; appellate counsel does not know
how much responsibility Mr. Ballard accepted or whether he addressed the district court
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with respect to disposition because this Court denied his request that a transcript of that
hearing be prepared. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing
Schedule.)
All three of the requested transcripts are within an Idaho appellate court's scope
of review. The transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all
proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court appropriately
revoked probation. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we
review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.
We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as
events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation.")
(emphasis added). Additionally, failure to include a transcript on appeal results in the
application of a presumption that the missing transcript supports the actions of the
district court. See State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Burdett has
failed to include the transcript from his change of plea hearing wherein, according to the
district court minutes, he was examined by the court regarding his guilty plea. Portions
of a transcript missing on appeal are presumed to support the actions of the district
court.").
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both

I

due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of

I~

proceedings on appeal.

I

The decision to deny Mr. Ballard's Motion to Augment will

render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts
support the district court's order revoking probation. This functions as a procedural bar
to the review of Mr. Ballard's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore,
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Mr. Ballard should either be provided with the requested transcripts, or the presumption
should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Ballard With
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated against the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, the United
States Supreme Court reasoned that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably
related to due process that the denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a
hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 64. The Supreme Court also stated that, under the facts
of Powell "the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure to make
an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... [and to] hold otherwise would be to ignore
the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 'that there are certain immutable
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member
of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 65 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898)).
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny in determining that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants with
counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of Douglas
was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. According to the
United States Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Doug/as that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
14

has a right to counsel at trialOwould be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.

Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.
According to the United States Supreme Court, to be constitutionally effective
appellate counsel must make a conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in
support of the best arguments to be made. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967).

In Anders, the Court held that the constitutional requirements of substantial

equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an active
advocate on behalf of his client . . . . [counsel's1 role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." Id.; see also Banuelos v. State,
127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested
transcripts has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination
of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether
there is factual support either in favor of any argument made or undercutting any
argument made.

Therefore, Mr. Ballard has not obtained review of the court

proceedings based on the merits and cannot receive the effective assistance of counsel
that is guaranteed by the Constitution.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,137 (1989) (overruled on

other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held
the starting point of evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel
in a criminal action is the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION.

These standards still offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of defense counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
II:

I

Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect

15

the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . .. Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-B.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
decision to revoke probation. Further, appellate counsel is unable to advise Mr. Ballard
on the probable role the transcripts may play in this appeal.
Mr. Ballard is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the requested
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Ballard his

constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Ballard's Probation And
When It Failed To Reduce His Sentence Sua Sponte Upon Revoking His Probation

A.

Introduction
Mr. Ballard asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his

probation and executed the underlying sentence without sua sponte reducing it in light
of the mitigating factors present and the district court's mistaken belief that Mr. Ballard
had previously participated in two riders in this case.
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B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Ballard's
Probation And Executed The Underlying Sentence Without Sua Sponte
Reducing It
Two issues that arise in probation revocation proceedings and are relevant here,

both of which are discretionary, are: (1) whether probation should be revoked, and (2)
"if a prison sentence previously has been pronounced but suspended, should that
sentence be ordered into execution or should the court order a reduced sentence as
authorized by I.C.R. 35." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001) (citation
omitted); see also State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 594 (2008) (upon revoking
probation, "the court can sua sponte reduce the sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 35").
At the disposition hearing on Mr. Ballard's probation violations, the district court
declined to send Mr. Ballard on what would have been a second rider in this case,
explaining that he had already completed two riders in this case, and concluding that it
would be inappropriate to grant him "a third retained jurisdiction in this matter."
(Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.30, L.1.) The district court's belief, that Mr. Ballard had previously
completed two riders in this case, was incorrect. (See generally, R.)
At the disposition hearing, Mr. Ballard was given the opportunity to speak on his
own behalf. Mr. Ballard provided a thorough and thoughtful explanation as to why he
felt that his probation had been unsuccessful, including describing his attempts to
abstain from alcohol as "an ongoing struggle" and his life's goal as "remain[ing] sober
for the rest of my life." Mr. Ballard explained that he has "been an alcoholic probably
since 12, 13 years old," having grown up in an alcoholic family, in which his immediate
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and extended family, as well as people in his community,6 regularly drank to excess.
He went on to acknowledge that it was "my fault that I relapsed" and that, once he had
relapsed, he figured that he had failed at his recovery and continued to relapse.

He

now intends to "continue to learn about alcohol and drugs so that I can overcome my
addiction to be a - someway, somehow to be a positive role model in my community,
especially the community out there in Fort Hall, the reservation."

He concluded by

noting that he needed help, and that he "could see myself in a, in a better light when I'm
sober; and my thoughts and my, my thinking are clear." (Tr., p.19, L.10 - p.26, L.7.)
Mr. Ballard submitted three exhibits in support of his request that he be given
another rider.

One of those exhibits was a letter from his fiancee, in which she

explained that she is a sober influence in his life, and explained that she supported
Mr. Ballard because he "has made positive attempts on changing his lifestyle, beliefs
and working to provide for, and become family oriented. He supports my 4 children as a
father figure and a provider to the household." She went on to request that the district
court allow him to participate in a treatment program in a local facility.

(Defendant's

Exhibit A.) Another exhibit was a certificate of completion for the Anger Management
Course at the Fort Hall Detention Center while he was awaiting disposition on his
probation violations. (Defendant's Exhibit B.)
In light of the district court's mistaken belief that Mr. Ballard had already
completed two riders for this case, and the mitigating circumstances known to the
district court at the time of the probation disposition hearing, Mr. Ballard asserts that the

6 Mr. Ballard is a Native American who was raised on a reservation.
Investigation Report File, pp.1, 8.)
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(Presentence

district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and failed to reduce his
sentence sua sponte upon revoking his probation.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Ballard respectfully requests that this Court order that he be placed on
probation in this case.

In the alternative, he requests that this Court reduce his

sentence as it deems appropriate, or remand this matter to the district court for a new
probation disposition hearing.
DATED this 15th day of June, 2012.

III'
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